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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Poland/Czechoslovakia			D	ATE DISTR.	29 Ma	y 1952
SUBJECT	Location of Polish Di Soviet Strategic Plan			N	O. OF PAGES	2	
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- 1. The enclosed map shows the disposition of the 16 Polish divisions (four of them mechanized). It indicates that Central and Eastern Poland are largely denuded of Polish troops. The 1 Division is in Warsaw and the 18 in Bialystok, but as far west as Miedzyrzecz (Meseritz) near the Polish-German border, the central area of Poland is being kept free of Polish troops to facilitate the eventual transport of Soviet troops toward the west.
- 2. The major concentrations of Polish divisions are in the north, including the 15, 16 Mechanized, 8 Mechanized, 12, 14, and 5 Divisions; and in the south, including the 11 Mechanized, 10 Mechanized, 4, 7, 6, 2, 9, and 3 Divisions. The Soviet Army plans to use all available rail and road connections from east to west across Poland in the case of an emergency.
- The USSR railroad net can transport more Soviet divisions to the Polish frontier than can be transported by the Polish railroad network to the Polish-German fontier. The proportion is about 75 percent; therefore the rest must be transported through Poland by road.
- 4. The distribution of the Polish forces is determined by two major factors:
 - The Polish Army must be taken out of the way, to free the transport lines across Poland for Soviet transports.
 - b. A revolt in the Polish Army could become extremely dangerous. To avoid united action, the Soviets had to divide the Polish forces into two separate groups, giving them different missions: in the north, to defend the Baltic coast; in the south, to assist the Czechoslovak Army, or to defend the Czechoslovak-Polish border against a successful Western intrusion into Czechoslovakia.

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
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Thus, for logistic and security reasons as well as for operational reasons, the Polish Army was divided as indicated on the attached map. This explains why three quarters of the peacetime units have been placed on the southern mountains and on the northern sea frontiers which are the least exposed to attack.

- 5. Recent speeches of Czechoslovak Premier Antonin Zapotocky and Defense Minister Alexej Cepicka confirm that the Czechoslovak Army's strategic task is to defend the Sumava and Cesky Les (Boehmerwald) fortified zone so as to protect the concentration of the Soviet armies west of the Carpathians.
- 6. The Soviet Army, already faced with a transport bottleneck on the Polish frontier, would have to solve even worse rail transport difficulties in Eastern Germany, where no more than two-thirds of the rail transports coming from Poland could be taken care of. The use of motor transport to make up for this deficiency would not prove sufficient. Therefore, the Soviet Army must exploit the Transcarpathian railroad connections leading from the western Ukraine through Slovakia and Hungary.
- 7. The Soviet Occupation Army in Austria being weak, and western Bohemia being directly exposed to an attack from the west, this concentration zone south of the Sudeten Mountains must be protected by the Czechoslovak Army, reinforced by the Polish Army's Southern Group.

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ATTACHMENT



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